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STILL Too CLOSE TO CALL? RETHINKING STAMPP'S
"THE CONCEPT OF A PERPETUAL UNION"
Daniel W. Hamilton*
In a classic article in the Journal of American History, which was
based on his presidential address to the Organization of American
Historians in 1978, the great Civil War historian Kenneth Stampp made
the claim that the arguments in favor of the constitutionality of secession
made by the Southern states were as strong, if not stronger than the
constitutional arguments made, then and now, in opposition to
secession.' Stampp is to my mind the greatest Civil War historian of the
20th century and his views on secession remain required reading and are
cited routinely today.
This is not to say Stampp was correct, only to use his classic article
on the 150th anniversary of secession as a jumping off point for
reconsidering the legality and constitutionality of secession and also, I
think, to go to first principles to consider whether it is possible or useful
to definitively try and answer the question: was secession legal?
This is a thought piece, a historiographical meditation, or more
accurately something of a polemic, with very little of archival heavy
lifting, but still asking questions that bedevil Civil War historians about
the perhaps irresistible presentism in the field of Civil War legal
history.2
Stampp presented secession as "the fundamental issue of the [Civil
W]ar" and framed secession as a constitutional crisis that turned on
questions surrounding "the locus of sovereignty in the political structure
that the Constitution of 1787 had formed." In particular, Stampp asked:
did the Constitution "create a union of sovereign states, each of which
retained the right to secede at its own discretion? Or did it create a
* Professor of Law and History, University of Illinois College of Law. Co-Director of the Illinois
Legal History Program.
1. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept ofa PerpetualUnion, J. AM. HIST., June 1978, at 5.
2. Some of the following argument is based on claims I made in Getting Right Without
Lincoln, 45 TULSA L. REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 715 (2010).

3.

Stampp, supra note 1, at 5.
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union from which no state, once having joined, could escape except by
an extra-constitutional act of revolution?'A The Constitution, Stampp
concluded, was "silen[t] on this crucial question."5 Indeed, he argues
that "the unionist case was sufficiently flawed to make it uncertain
whether in 1865 reason and logic were on the side of the victors."6 This
is not to say the union was wrong, and Stampp is quick to add that "in
the tangled web of claim[] and counterclaim[]" it was unclear whether
reason and logic were "indisputably on either side."
In this way, Stampp lays the groundwork for the argument that the
Confederate constitutional argument for secession was as reasonable and
logical as the Union's, and in particular, Lincoln's constitutional
argument for a perpetual union. This was novel then and now-even
heretical, in so far as it challenges Lincoln's arguments in the First
Inaugural and elsewhere that secession was manifestly unconstitutional
and illegal, a position later adopted by the Supreme Court in 1869 in
Texas v. White.8
To do this, Stampp deploys a kind of historically nuanced
originalism, not in the service of answering a modem constitutional
question, but in the service of demonstrating an essential ambiguity in
Philadelphia in 1787 on the question of whether the Constitution created
a perpetual union, concluding "[i]n truth, the wording of the Constitution
gives neither the believers in the right of secession nor the advocates of a
perpetual union a case so decisive that all reasonable persons are bound
to accept it." 9

Turning from the text to the debates in Philadelphia, Stampp found
similar "baffling inconsistencies and obscurities."' 0 Moreover, the
ratification debates did not provide greater clarity so that "in 1789, when
the present Union came into existence, the question of whether a
member state could secede at will remained unresolved."" The question
of the legality of secession was of course continually debated in the
antebellum era, in the debates over the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions, over the admission of slave and free states to the Union,
and most dramatically in the Nullification Crisis in the 1830s. It was
then that for Stampp an American president offered, in Andrew
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id. at6.
Id.
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869).
Stampp, supra note 1, at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 19.
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Jackson's Proclamation on Nullification in 183212 that "the concept of a
perpetual union had achieved its full development, and a President of the
United States had pledged himself to use all the power of the federal
government to uphold it."' 3 Lincoln and the Supreme Court relied upon
Jackson's proclamation in making their arguments for a perpetual union
decades later.
Even then, though, Stampp argues that by the time of the
Nullification Crisis, "the case for state sovereignty and the constitutional
right of secession had flourished for forty years before a comparable
case for perpetual union had been devised."l 4 Thus, "because that case
came so late, because the logic behind it was far from perfect, because
the Constitution and the debates over ratification were fraught with
ambiguity," it remained the case that the question could ultimately only
be settled by war.'5 And there Stampp ends the article.
This is to my mind a radical endpoint, one that embraces historical
uncertainty on a crucial constitutional question, perhaps the central
constitutional question of the Civil War. Stampp poses the question:
"was secession unconstitutional?" And answers with, to my mind, a
salutary and even correct answer: "we don't know." Both sides had
compelling arguments made over decades and both sides could draw on
history in making their claims, and each claim was as logical and
reasonable as the other.
This is a radical endpoint for two reasons. First because it refuses
to answer the question: "was secession constitutional?" Stampp refuses
to answer this question because it is, he shows, essentially unanswerable,
or at least too close to call, and unresolved as a legal and constitutional
matter at the time of secession. If Stampp is correct, this raises the
question whether we, 150 years later, can stand uncertainty on such a
fundamental constitutional question of the Civil War. What if we cannot
definitively answer the question: "did Lincoln have the legal authority
to war to suppress secession?" Second, Stampp's argument is radical for
the simple fact that it suggests that the Confederacy's legal claim for
secession was as valid as the Union's claim for perpetual union. It is
here that Stampp, to my mind, may have mischaracterized secession by
12. Andrew Jackson, Proclamation,in COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY, GEN. COURT OF MASS.,
STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION: INCLUDING THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ASSEMBLED AT COLUMBIA, NOVEMBER 19, 1932, AND MARCH 11,
1833, THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SEVERAL STATE LEGISLATURES WHICH HAVE ACTED ON THE SUBJECT 75 (1834).
13. Stampp, supranote 1, at 32.

14. Id. at 33.
15. Id.
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making the claim that secession can be considered as a legal question
standing alone.
Let me turn to each point in turn. More than sixty years ago, David
Donald wrote his landmark essay Getting Right With Lincoln.16 Donald
wrote mostly about politicians' use of Abraham Lincoln since his
assassination, and in particular how Lincoln was transformed from a
deeply divisive symbol, into, by the end of World War II, "everybody's
grandfather" or a "nonpartisan, nonsectional hero." It thus became
increasingly necessary to seek Lincoln's imagined blessing for a given
political position or candidate or party, and by the middle of the 20th
century, "no reputable political organization could omit a reference to
the Great Emancipator, nor could the disreputable ones." What Donald
brought to light most vividly was the blatantly opportunistic use of
Lincoln in political discourse. Yet in the end, Donald is careful not to
mock or condemn this practice outright, which remains a staple of our
politics. The symbolism of Lincoln remains potent and has a history of
its own. Donald is also careful not to try and get right, or get wrong,
with Lincoln, and if anything, his treatment is admiring but waryconcluding that "perhaps the secret of Lincoln's continuing vogue is his
essential ambiguity."' 8
What Donald brought to light most vividly was the drive to get
right with Lincoln in American politics. Yet the drive to get right with
Lincoln is also at the heart of most of the legal and Constitutional history
of the Civil War. The academic manifestation of this drive is twofold.
First, Lincoln is most often at the center of the story, making the
Congress and the courts and other legal actors bit players, relevant only
in so far as they interact with Lincoln. Second, Lincoln is forced, in
varying degrees, into the present. This presentism takes the form of
different versions of the same basic question: was Lincoln right, was he
justified in doing what he did during the Civil War?l 9 Was he right to
meet secession with military force? To suspend the writ of habeas
corpus? Or to declare a blockade or to call up the army or to exile
political prisoners to the Confederacy? Was he right to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation? These questions are central in much of the
16. David Donald, Getting Right With Lincoln, reprinted in LINCOLN RECONSIDERED:
ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1st ed. 1961).

17. Matthew Pinsker, Lincoln Theme 2.0, J. AM. HIST., Sept. 2009, at 417.
18. Hamilton, supranote 2, at 715.
19. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926).

It remains

central in leading accounts of Civil War legal history. See 2 MICHAEL BURLINGAME, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: A LIFE (2008); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991).
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academic writing on Civil War and it is here that the popular and
academic drive to get right with Lincoln merge. The popular and
cultural force of Lincoln remains so strong, he remains such a talisman
for our time, that even we historians cannot consign him to the past. Not
only do we need him to make rulings on our actions in the presentwhat would Lincoln think of Guantanamo-but we also need to make
rulings on his actions as president as part of our ongoing debates on
presidential power and the Constitution in wartime.2 0
This is not to say that legal historians of the Civil War are
predominantly presentist, or that they are only interested in whether
Lincoln was right. This is to say that there is in much Civil War history
a central presentist preoccupation that does not loom as large in any
other era, namely, whether particular legal and constitutional actions
were justified in some absolute sense. We historians do not generally
ask whether Lord Grenville was right to issue the Stamp Act, or whether
Jackson was right to crush the Bank of the United States or whether
Wilson was right to sign the Treaty of Versailles. We do not, in other
words, usually ask whether a historical actor was right or wrong by our
lights. Yet we cannot resist asking this about legal actors during the
Civil War, particularly Lincoln. I simply do not know if Lincoln was
right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and I maintain we cannot
answer this question historically. We might be able to explain why he
suspended the writ, or the effects of its suspension then and afterwards.
We can also bring to light the competing legal arguments made at the
time, and explain why some won and others lost. But we cannot survey
the sources and come to a definitive ruling on the merits on these central
legal questions any more than we can come to definitive understanding
of the original meaning of the due process clause. We will never know
if Lincoln was right or justified in his legal actions any more than we
will know whether Cromwell and his supporters were right to execute
Charles I.
This is also not to say that historians need to put on a white coat
and simply make scientific judgments about the weight of the facts. Of
course, our values infuse our writing of history; we only care about
history in large part because of its meaning in the present. We always
and at all times bring our values into our work, yet these values are best
left at the service of the history we tell. We may present the Declaration
of Independence as radical and egalitarian or as conservative and
hierarchical or somewhere in between. The sources are open to either

20. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 715.
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interpretation. We do not, however, ask historians of the era to come to
a definitive conclusion as to whether Jefferson was right to assert the
Revolution was justified by international and natural law at the time and
so justifies revolution today.
The question that comes to mind in considering the legality of
secession, as Stampp did thirty years ago, is whether we are willing to
accept Stampp's answer of indeterminacy. That is, whether we might
have a legal history that of the Civil War that does not ultimately attempt
to answer these kinds of questions. Can we have a legal history of the
Civil War that does not evaluate constitutional and legal actions on the
merits, treating them as resolvable if only we get the law right? More
importantly perhaps, do we want one? If we lose Lincoln as the
centerpiece, do we lose a galvanizing figure that has given the field
coherence over decades? If we resist making rulings on legal actions,
and not providing answers to questions that people want answered by
historians, do we risk obscurity and familiar charges of relativism? If
there are no definitive answers to the question, then are there other
essential issues revolving around the Civil War that are equally
indeterminate?
It is almost customary that in books on the legal and constitutional
history of the Civil War there is an explicit move to seek out lessons we
might draw in the present. This concern for lessons is a red flag for
Lincoln and Civil War presentism, and is a part of many rich and
important histories. Lincoln's actions and that of the Congress and the
courts are parsed and declared either as legally and constitutionally
sound or unsound. To be sure, this makes the work more timely and
immediate and allows historians to take part in a decades-long
conversation assessing Lincoln's wartime actions. Yet to go into the
Civil War looking to answer our modern questions is, to my mind, to
distort the inquiry and is in the end too high a price to pay. Legal
arguments invite counter-arguments, but this temptation itself reveals the
mostly fruitless nature of this kind of historical debate. Legal arguments
are made back and forth with no winner because there can be no winner
in a ruling on the past. What if we walk away with a much richer
understanding of the relationship of President and Supreme Court in the
Civil War and nothing else? This is enough for almost any other era, but
it seems on the great constitutional questions of the Civil War, that we
are largely unwilling to leave them indeterminate.
This is not to say that legal actors in the Union and the Confederacy
did not themselves reach legal and constitutional conclusions. But we in
the present remain open to arguments from all sides and remain rooted in
400
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Was secession legal?

401

Was the

confiscation of enemy property constitutional? Was the blockade within
presidential power? All of these questions rested on the status of the
Union and the Confederacy during the Civil War, which was contested
during the Civil War and for decades afterwards.
It is of course the case that there were winners and losers in the
Civil War and that this colors the way we understand the legal questions
we pose about the war. It is not enough to say that these questions about
the nature of the Civil War cannot be definitively answered. Even as we
reconstruct the arguments made on both sides on secession, we must
recall at all times this was not a debating society but a contest over
power during war. If today we cannot make a definitive ruling on the
ultimate legality of secession, it is folly to reconstruct the legal
arguments made during the War without attention to who won and who
lost the argument and why. At points it is surely a case of might making
right, or a legal argument settled at the point of a gun. Whatever the
legality of secession, it was surely settled as a practical matter at
Appomattox. But that is only the ending.
It is the contingent and uncertain path to that point that is
historically compelling. If our task is to definitively determine the
legality of secession, then once that is done we know who is right and
who is wrong and how the Civil War ought to turn out. If by contrast we
do not ourselves settle the question, then we see this argument played
out over years of warfare, and we see the relative power of these ideas
inside northern and southern society. It surely matters that the legality
of secession was ultimately rejected, and this is in no small part a story
of the relative power of competing ideologies inside societies at war.
The Stampp piece, to my mind, has stood the test of time and
remains essential reading, indeed remains the model for how the legal
inquiry on secession ought to be pursued. It remains the model not
because he arrives at the right answer but instead for his embrace of
historical uncertainty.
Any of us who write on the Civil War are asked the questions
Stampp raises, and others: Was secession justified? Who was right in
the debate over habeas corpus, Taney or Lincoln? Who was right and
who was wrong across a number of great constitutional questions? The
answer I am calling for-"I do not know"-distances the past from the
present in a way we almost cannot stand when it comes to the Civil War.
It is here that the academic quality of academic writing, for good and for
ill, might most contrast with the dominant narrative of the Civil War. It
is an open question for the field: "is the history sufficient and can it
401
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stand alone, with values embedded in the story we tell, and not the
definitive legal answers we provide?"
Yet this answer to the question of who was right on secession, I do
not know, runs the risk of mischaracterizing the meaning of secession
both at the time of the Civil War and today, and this brings me briefly to
my second point. It may be that secession may ultimately be most
fundamentally not a close legal question, but rather a vessel for our
questions about the meaning of slavery and emancipation. This is a
historical question:
"was secession essentially a referendum on
slavery?" This is the essential Stampp neglects in his constitutional
inquiry. If the answer is yes, then Stampp, in his emphasis on
constitutional thought standing alone, both sheds light on secession and
also omits the centrality of slavery in the secession crisis.
Secession may be most important, then and now, as a symbol, a
symbol of the legitimacy of the Confederacy and the fight to preserve
slavery. Interestingly, it may be that the symbolic meaning of secession
was embraced by both sides, an embrace of secession as essentially
driven by states' rights, and an embrace of states' rights that turned in
both North and South, as Paul shows, largely on the question of the
preservation and expansion of slavery. It is here that Stampp's legal
focus leads us astray and presents us with an analytical frame we ought
now to reject-namely treating secession as primarily a legal question.
This does not mean that the legal argument is irrelevant or that it was
infinitely malleable at the time. This means only that a legal question
turning on states' rights and the right to secede was at all times
embedded in the debate over slavery and cannot be considered first as a
legal question and then as a political or social question.
This is even more apparent when one examines the staying power
of the symbolic meaning of secession. The legitimacy of secession was
at the heart of the Lost Cause and remains a potent symbol today for
those seeking to deny the centrality of slavery to secession. In this way,
Stampp's frame, in its presentation of a contained legal question, seems
to me to miss a defining aspect of secession. Stampp might well admit
this of course, but to my mind, cannot make the claim that his only
concern for purposes of this piece was the law and the Constitution.
This is, I think, an untenable dichotomy and one that has largely,
thankfully collapsed. It is here that the presentist obsession with
determining the ultimate legality of secession actually aids the history
because it forces upon us the realization that our present concern for the
place of slavery with secession was very much a concern of the Civil
402
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War era. It is a powerful reason why we still care so much about
secession and why actors at the time did as well.
We do not have to choose, indeed, between the abstract question of
the legality of secession and its contrast with the lived experience of
secession. We can examine contemporaries' competing assessments of
legal and constitutional doctrine even as we take the realities of race and
slavery into account.
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